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ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES 
Louis T. Visscher 
I. Introduction 
A. Economic Goals of Tort Law and the Law of Damages 
1 Many lawyers regard compensation as the most important goal of tort law. 
However, in the words of Williams, “this…does not look below the surface of 
things. Granted that the immediate object of the tort action is to compensate 
the plaintiff at the expense of the tortfeasor, why do we wish to do this?… An 
intelligent approach to the study of law must take account of its purpose, and 
must be prepared to test the law critically in the light of its purpose.”1 Keeton 
argues that the primary function of tort law is not to compensate the losses, 
but to determine when compensation is required.2 A similar argument is made 
by Fleming and Rogers.3 Losses of the victim are only shifted to the tortfeasor 
if there are reasons to do so. These reasons can be found in the goals of tort 
law. 
2 In the economic analysis of tort law, minimization of total accident costs is 
regarded as the paramount goal. These costs are subdivided into primary acci-
dent costs (the costs of precautionary measures and the losses that still occur), 
secondary accident costs (the costs of having to bear a certain loss) and terti-
ary accident costs (the administrative costs of the legal system dealing with 
the accident losses).4 The reduction of primary costs is achieved by deterrence 
and the reduction of secondary accident costs by loss spreading. Tertiary costs 
decrease if the costs of administering the treatment of accidents are reduced. 
Hence, in the economic analysis of tort law, compensation is not regarded as a 
goal, but as a means with which the goal of cost reduction is striven for.5 
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3 While engaged in their activities, people may create negative externalities, i.e. 
a probability for others to suffer losses as a result of the activity. Tort law is 
seen as an instrument that can provide behavioural incentives to the actors, so 
that they internalize these externalities. The threat of being held liable induces 
the actors to incorporate the possible losses of others into their decision on 
how much care to take and how often to engage in the activity. Taking more 
care and/or reducing the activity level can lower the probability of an accident 
and thereby the expected accident losses.6 Optimal care and optimal activity 
are taken when the marginal costs of taking more care or further reducing the 
activity level equal the marginal benefits thereof in the sense of a reduction in 
the expected accident losses.7 
4 This economic line of reasoning implies that damages should be high enough 
for the injurer to internalize the externalities he has caused. Under a rule of 
strict liability, this in essence means that damages should fully compensate the 
victim for his losses. Under a rule of negligence, damages should be high 
enough to make taking due care, which from an economic point of view 
should equal optimal care, more attractive than applying a lower care level. In 
situations where both the injurer and the victim can influence the accident 
probability, no rule is able to provide both parties with the correct activity in-
centives. Only the residual risk bearer will incorporate all relevant costs in his 
activity decisions. Under strict liability this is the injurer, under the negligence 
rule, the victim (because the injurer who takes due care is not liable and hence 
does not bear the expected accident losses). 
 
Trebilcock, Exploring the Domain of Accident Law. Taking the Facts Seriously (1996). 
For more recent empirical literature on the prevention goal, see e.g. J.D. Cummins, R.D. 
Phillips and M.A. Weiss, The Incentive Effects of No-Fault Automobile Insurance, The 
Journal of Law and Economics (J. L. & Econ.) 44 (2001) 427-464; A. Cohen and R. De-
hejia, The Effect of Automobile Insurance and Accident Liability Laws on Traffic Fatal-
ities‟, J. L. & Econ. 47 (2004) 357-393 and D.P. Kessler and D.L. Rubinfeld, Empirical 
Study of the Civil Justice System, in: A.M. Polinsky and S. Shavell (Eds.), Handbook of 
Law and Economics Volume 1 (2007) 343-402. 
6 The remark of A.P. Scarso in no. 4 of his report on Italy that “a deterrent purpose of tort 
law exists when the role of the defendant‟s conduct is assessed either as a factor affect-
ing the imposition of liability or the amount of damages awarded or in cases where the 
benefits gained through the damaging event are taken into account in determining the 
amount of damages” therefore is contrary to the Law and Economics point of view. Af-
ter all, also a rule of strict liability, where the conduct of the tortfeasor is not assessed, 
can provide correct care and activity incentives to the tortfeasor. 
7 See among many others R.A. Posner, A Theory of Negligence, Journal of Legal Studies 
(JLS) 1 (1972) 29-96; S. Shavell, Strict Liability versus Negligence, JLS 9 (1980) 1-25 
S. Shavell, Economic Analysis of Accident Law (1987); W.M. Landes and R.A. Posner, 
The Economic Structure of Tort Law (1987); S. Shavell, Foundations of Economic 
Analysis of Law (2004) 178 ff.; H.-B. Schäfer and C. Ott, Lehrbuch der ökonomischen 
Analyse des Zivilrechts (4
th
 ed. 2005) 129 ff.; R.D. Cooter and T.S. Ulen, Law and Eco-
nomics (5
th
 ed. 2008) 336 ff. 
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B. Economic Goals of Punitive Damages 
5 In much legal literature, deterrence and punishment are seen as the main goals 
of punitive damages. Several country reports in this book mention the same,8 
as does Geistfeld regarding the opinion of the U.S. Supreme Court.9 This 
opens the question how this viewpoint fits in the economic framework. After 
all, if the injurer has to pay higher damages than the losses he has caused, a 
risk of over-deterrence might be created. In such a situation, the injurer takes 
too much care and/or engages too little in his activity, as compared to the so-
cially optimal care and activity level. Given that the prevention goal aims at 
optimal levels, this goal then is not reached. Furthermore, economic literature 
regarding „optimal enforcement‟ deals with the question of when tort law is 
the preferable legal instrument, and when criminal law is. These insights are 
relevant in discussing the punishment goal of punitive damages. 
6 In the following sections, I will discuss the economic arguments in favour of 
punitive damages, both from a deterrence point of view as well as from a pun-
ishment perspective. Where relevant, I will connect the economic insights to 
the country reports in this book, to put the economic analysis of punitive dam-
ages into perspective. It is important to realize that tort law and criminal law 
do not operate in a vacuum, but are different legal instruments which both are 
concerned with undesirable behaviour. In order to keep the analysis focussed 
on the topic of punitive damages, which is embedded in tort law, my analysis 
also centres on tort law. Hence, I will not fully discuss the possibilities of 
criminal law to address the issues that tort law also faces.10 I do, however, in 
Section III.A explain that in Law and Economics, both tort law and criminal 
law are primarily regarded as instruments which may deter undesirable behav-
iour. Hence, the view that tort law aims at compensation while criminal law 
 
8 A.J. Sebok, report United States no. 1; V. Wilcox, report England no. 1; J.-S. Borghetti, 
report France no. 4 and 35; N. Jansen and L. Rademacher, report Germany no. 4; B. As-
keland, report Scandinavia no. 4; A. Menyhárd, report Hungary no 6 and 27. B.A. Koch 
in his report on European Law explains in no. 14 ff. that legislation and ECJ decisions 
require sanctions to be 'effective, proportionate and dissuasive'. This phrasing suggests 
that the deterrent function of tort damages is taken seriously and may result in supra 
compensatory damages. However, Koch makes clear in no. 39 that, even though viola-
tions should be prevented to the extent possible, terminology such as 'dissuasive' or 'de-
terrent' are not intended to promote supra compensatory damages. In no. 41 Koch men-
tions the possible exception of private enforcement of antitrust rules by way of non-
compensatory damages, a topic which I will discuss in no. 15 below. 
9 M. Geistfeld, Punitive Damages, Retribution, and Due Process, Southern California Law 
Review (S. Cal. L. Rev.) 81 (2008) 269. In the recent decision Exxon Shipping Co. et al. 
v. Baker et al., the Supreme Court again clearly states this, where it considers in Section 
IV B that „regardless of the alternative rationales over the years, the consensus today is 
that punitives are aimed not at compensation but principally at retribution and deterring 
harmful conduct‟. 
10 This topic is discussed in the Law and Economics literature on “optimal enforcement”, 
see footnotes 51 ff. below. 
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aims at punishment and deterrence, is not shared. Given the focus on tort law, 
I do not discuss the possibilities of the so-called act-based sanctions from e.g. 
administrative law and criminal law, where the sanction is based on a mere 
wrongful act. Tort damages are so-called harm-based sanctions, which can 
only be applied after harm has occurred. The strengths and weaknesses of act-
based and harm-based sanctions, as well as of preclusionary measures which 
make the behaviour impossible in the first place, is extensively discussed in 
the economic literature. Hence, it would not be correct to assume that the eco-
nomic analysis of tort law has to conclude that mere risk-creating activities 
should already be regarded as torts and should open the possibilities of dam-
ages. In cases where it is better to attach the sanction to the act than to the 
harm, tort law is not the suited instrument.11 
7 To be sure, I do not consider compensation to be a goal of punitive damages. 
First, compensation is not regarded as an independent goal in the economic 
analysis of tort law to begin with.12 Second, even if compensation were re-
garded as a goal of tort law, the fact that punitive damages exceed compensa-
tory damages already shows that compensation cannot be the goal of punitive 
damages.13 
II. Economic Reasons for Punitive Damages: Deterrence 
A. Probability of Being Held Liable is Below 100% 
8 The above explained economic line of reasoning that actors derive behav-
ioural incentives from the tort system, implicitly assumed that if a tortfeasor 
causes losses for which he should be liable, he will indeed be held liable. He 
then faces the full negative externalities he has caused. However, many rea-
sons exist why the probability of being held liable falls below 100%. 
 
11 R.J. Van den Bergh and L.T. Visscher, Optimal Enforcement of Safety Law, in: R.V. de 
Mulder (Ed.), Mitigating Risk in the Context of Safety and Security. How relevant is a 
rational approach?, Rotterdam: Erasmus University Rotterdam (2008) 47 ff. A clear ex-
ample of the different types of measures is the following. Losses due to traffic accidents 
as a result of speeding can be targeted by preclusionary measures (e.g. Intelligent Speed 
Adaptation (ISA) which limits the vehicle to the maximum speed at that location), act-
based sanction (fines for speeding) or harm-based sanctions (liability in cases where 
speeding has caused an accident).  
12 This sharply contrasts with the Spanish report, where P. del Olmo explains in no. 4 that 
in Spain compensation is regarded as the only normative goal and that prevention is at 
best seen as a by-product of non-contractual liability. Menyhárd in the Hungarian report, 
on the other hand, mentions in no. 27 that prevention is regarded as a main function of 
civil liability. 
13 See e.g. A. Duggan, Exemplary Damages in Equity: A Law and Economics Perspective, 
Oxford Journal of Legal Studies (OJLS) 26 (2006) 308. 
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9 First, it might be difficult or even impossible for the victim to prove negli-
gence (if required) or causation on the side of the tortfeasor. Polinsky and 
Shavell provide the example of an individual who develops a form of cancer 
that could have developed naturally, but also due to exposure to a man-made 
carcinogen.14 The same would obviously hold true if not only the tortfeasor, 
but also the victim himself might be the cause of the losses, for example an 
employee of an asbestos processing company who smokes and later develops 
lung cancer. It could also be the case that the victim does not know the iden-
tity of the tortfeasor in the first place, for instance if he was involved in a hit-
and-run accident in which the identity of the tortfeasor remains unknown. 
10 Second, the victim might suffer from what is known in the economic analysis 
of law as „rational apathy‟. This means that the victim might find it too expen-
sive to bring a suit against the tortfeasor, when comparing the costs to the ex-
pected outcome of the trial. This problem might occur especially in situations 
where the losses are scattered over many victims. The total losses however 
might be substantial so that it would be socially advantageous if the tortfeasor 
would be held liable after all. 
11 Third, the injurer might take steps to avoid detection in cases where he inten-
tionally committed the tort.15 This obviously lowers the probability of being 
held liable. 
12 In all these situations, a tort has been committed and the tortfeasor should be 
liable for the resulting losses. However, if the victim does not bring a suit, the 
tortfeasor does not face liability. If not all victims bring a suit, or if they sue 
but fail because they cannot prove all the required elements, the probability of 
the tortfeasor being held liable falls below 100%. Hence, the tortfeasor no 
longer correctly weighs the costs of precautionary measures against the de-
crease they cause in the total losses, but only the decrease they cause in his 
expected liability. Given that the losses exceed the expected liability, the tort-
feasor does not take adequate precautions and/or engages in the activity too 
often. 
13 Punitive damages can ameliorate this situation.16 After all, if the probability of 
being held liable lies below 100%, but the damages to be paid if held liable 
exceed the losses, expected liability can again have the correct size. The factor 
with which compensatory damages should be multiplied, is the reciprocal of 
 
14 A.M. Polinksy and S. Shavell, Punitive Damages, in: P. Newman (ed.), The New Pal-
grave Dictionary of Economics and the Law (1998) 193. 
15 W.M. Landes and R.A. Posner, The Economic Structure of Tort Law (1987) 160. 
16 See e.g. D.D. Ellis, Fairness and Efficiency in the Law of Punitive Damages, S. Cal. L. 
Rev. 56 (1982) 25 and 26; R.D. Cooter, Punitive Damages for Deterrence: When and 
How Much?, Alabama Law Review (Ala. L. Rev.) 40 (1989) 1148 ff; A.M. Polinksy and 
S. Shavell, Punitive Damages: An Economic Analysis, Harvard Law Review (Harv. L. 
Rev.) 111 (1998) 887 ff. 
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the probability of being held liable. So, if the probability of being held liable 
is 50%, compensatory damages should be doubled to provide the correct in-
centives. Polinsky and Shavell term this reciprocal the „total damages multi-
plier‟.17 Punitive damages then consist of total damages minus compensatory 
damages. The remark of Sebok that „the size of punitive-damages awards…is 
predictably determined by the size of the compensatory award‟18 is in my 
view consistent with this idea of punitive damages as a multiple of compensa-
tory damages. 
14 An early example of the idea that the sanction should be more severe if the 
probability of „being caught‟ is lower, can be found in the law of the Esh-
nunna (about 2000 B.C.): someone who was caught in the house or in the field 
of a palace or temple hierarch during daytime had to pay ten shekels of silver, 
someone who was caught at night was sentenced to death.19 A contemporary 
example is that a person, who causes a traffic accident and leaves the scene to 
escape sanctioning, not only may have committed a tort in causing the acci-
dent, but has also committed a crime in leaving the scene. The possible appli-
cable sanctions now become higher. Economically speaking, this makes sense 
to counter the decreased probability of conviction. The fact that punitive dam-
ages, if they are allowed, are often possible in settings of intentional torts20 
where the tortfeasor may try to avoid being caught is consistent with this eco-
nomic line of reasoning. Hence, punitive damages and criminal law both may 
improve the incentives which tort law provides through compensatory dam-
ages. 
15 The idea that punitive damages also serve to overcome the problem of rational 
apathy is present in the concept of treble damages in American antitrust law21 
and in the European debate on the possibility of double damages in EC anti-
trust law.22 The prospect of being able to collect more than just compensatory 
damages might induce victims of law infringements to bring a suit, even 
 
17 Polinksy and Shavell (fn. 14) 193. 
18 Sebok, no. 5. 
19 M.H. Fried, The State, the Chicken, and the Egg: or, What Came First?, in R. Cohen and 
E.R. Service (eds.), Origins of the State: the Anthropology of Political Evolution 44. 
This reference was found through the Dutch publication of H.O. Kerkmeester, Punitive 
damages ter compensatie van een lage veroordelingskans (“Punitive damages to offset a 
low probability of being convicted”), Nederlands Juristenblad (NJB) 73 (1998) 1808. 
20 Sebok, no. 6 and 63; Wilcox, no. 63 ff.; Borghetti, no. 46; Askeland, no. 12; Del Olmo, 
no. 6(d). 
21 See e.g. W.P.J. Wils, Should Private Antitrust Enforcement Be Encouraged in Europe?, 
World Competition (W. Comp.) 26 (2003) 476. 
22 See the Commission Staff Working Paper accompanying the White Paper on Damages 
actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules, SEC(2008) 404. Also see R. Van den Bergh, 
W. van Boom and M. van der Woude, The EC Green Paper on Damages Actions in An-
tritrust Cases - An Academic Comment (2006) 14 
<ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/antitrust/actionsdamages/files_green_paper_comments
/erasmus_university.pdf>. 
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though the costs outweigh the expected compensatory damages. Sebok in his 
report on the United States mentions that punitive damages can serve the goal 
of compensating costs which might not be covered by compensatory dam-
ages.23 This statement fits well into the idea of overcoming the rational apathy 
problem, by increasing the expected benefits of a lawsuit. It should be noted 
that, in as far as punitive damages are indeed able to ameliorate this problem, 
the probability of being held liable increases, and the damage multiplier 
should be reduced proportionally to avoid over-deterrence. 
16 A different way of putting the argument is this: Victims who claim damages 
in essence serve the social goal of deterrence. However, starting a lawsuit en-
tails costs, which are privately borne. This might lead to too few lawsuits be-
ing brought. Increasing the expected damages of victims by awarding punitive 
damages may solve this problem. Wilcox explicitly mentions this line of rea-
soning in her report on England.24 Polinsky and Shavell however warn against 
the idea that punitive damages may be used to induce parties to bring suits. 
After all, lawsuits entail litigation costs. From that perspective, it is better that 
the damage multiplier is high enough to offset the low probability of being 
held liable, without actually increasing the number of lawsuits.25 
B. Underestimation of Harm 
17 If there is a risk that compensatory damages fall short of the true losses of the 
victim, the injurer does not receive adequate behavioural incentives. This risk 
especially exists in situations where the losses are difficult to assess, for in-
stance in cases of immaterial losses, or if the subjective valuation of the nega-
tive externality as experienced by the victim is difficult to determine.26 In 
cases where certain types of losses are excluded from compensation, this 
problem also occurs.27 
 
23 Sebok, no. 36. The relevance of this factor is obviously influenced by the applicable rule 
regarding recovery of legal expenses. Given that under the English rule, as opposed to 
the American rule, a prevailing plaintiff can recover (part of) those costs from the defen-
dant, punitive damages are not required to cover these costs. On this issue, also see e.g. 
V. Behr, Punitive Damages in American and German Law – Tendencies Towards Ap-
proximation of Apparently Irreconcilable Concepts, Chicago-Kent Law Review (Chi.-
Kent L. Rev.) 78 (2003), 122 ff. 
24 Wilcox, no. 113. Also see Menyhárd, no. 7 and 30. 
25 Polinksy and Shavell (fn. 14) 197. 
26 It therefore should come as no surprise that punitive damages frequently occur in cases 
of defamation, where immaterial losses are important. See Sebok, no. 6. 
27 Ellis, S. Cal. L. Rev. 56 (1982) 27. If the legal system has deliberately excluded certain 
types of losses from compensation, it remains to be seen if they should be included in 
the punitive damages, as this would boil down to a circumvention of the exclusion. The 
relevant question from a Law and Economics point of view then is, whether these losses 
are rightfully excluded from compensation. 
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18 Including such losses in punitive damages, however, might be problematic in 
itself, because in order to determine the correct amount of punitive damages, 
the same measurement problems that caused these losses to be excluded from 
compensatory losses, reappear.28 Polinksy and Shavell argue that if certain 
types of losses should be included in damages, they should be included in 
compensatory damages. After all, punitive damages are measured less accu-
rately than compensatory damages and they are applied much less often. 
Hence, the problem of incomplete compensatory damages is no good reason 
to include these losses in punitive damages instead.29 
19 If the risk of underestimating the harm of the victim is realistic, could it then 
make sense to base the damages of the injurer on his gains, if these are higher, 
instead of on the harm? In absence of the problem of underestimation of harm, 
economic theory prefers damages to be based on harm rather than on gains. 
After all, if the injurer compensates the harm he has caused, he internalizes 
the externality and receives the correct incentives. Basing damages on the as-
sumedly higher gains would provide excessive behavioural incentives. Only if 
the gains can be labelled socially illicit, the literature sees a reason to remove 
the injurer‟s gains.30 Obviously, in countries where „unjustified enrichment‟ 
constitutes a separate legal action, this may be the indicated instrument. How-
ever, in debates regarding the goals of tort law, avoiding unjustified enrich-
ment of the tortfeasor is often mentioned as a separate goal of this body of law 
as well.31 An additional reason why economic literature prefers to base dam-
ages on harm instead of gains is that an underestimation of those gains would 
still make the tort worthwhile to the tortfeasor. This would lead to a decrease 
in social welfare in situations where these gains are lower than the harm.32 
However, given that the problem of underestimating the harm of the victim 
provides the injurer with inadequate incentives, removing the profits of the in-
jurer may be a good solution after all, because it induces the injurer not to act 
in the first place. The English category „conduct calculated by the defendant 
to make a profit for himself which may well exceed the compensation payable 
to the claimant‟, nicely fits into this idea.33 However, if the risk of underesti-
mation of the losses is not present, the fact that the defendant yields higher 
gains is not enough to warrant punitive damages from an economic point of 
view.34 
 
28 Ellis, S. Cal. L. Rev. 56 (1982) 31; Polinksy and Shavell, Harv. L. Rev. 111 (1998) 940. 
29 Polinksy and Shavell, Harv. L. Rev. 111 (1998) 940, 941; Polinksy and Shavell (fn. 14) 
194. 
30 Polinksy and Shavell, Harv. L. Rev. 111 (1998) 919. 
31 See e.g. Behr, Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 78 (2003), 137 ff. 
32 A.M. Polinsky and S. Shavell, Should Liability Be Based on the Harm to the Victim or 
the Gain to the Injurer?, Journal of Law, Economics & Organization (J.L. Econ. & Org. ) 
10 (1994) 427-437. 
33 Wilcox, no. 18 ff. 
34 However, also see no. 50 ff. below. 
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20 Several country reports discuss the possibility of basing damages on gains 
rather than losses. Wilcox quotes Lord Diplock, who argues that damages 
might even have to exceed the actual gain of the defendant, even if these gains 
already outweigh the losses of the victim. After all, if the damages equal the 
gains, the defendant has nothing to lose from committing the act, while in 
situations where the plaintiff does not sue or does not succeed in his claim, the 
injurer keeps his gains.35 Borghetti in contrast states that in France, damages 
regarding illegal reproduction of a work protected by intellectual property 
cannot exceed the amount of the illicit profits made by the tortfeasor.36 Also 
in cases of unfair competition, French courts sometimes take the profits of the 
defendant into account.37 
C. Socially Unaccepted Costs or Benefits 
21 A next argument mentioned in economic literature regarding punitive dam-
ages is the situation where an injurer derives certain benefits from his tort 
which are regarded as socially unacceptable or alternatively, taking due care 
would create certain additional costs for the injurer, which are regarded as so-
cially irrelevant. For instance, if I derive pleasure from causing someone else 
pain, merely having to compensate his losses might not deter me from my act, 
because after compensating the losses, I still have experienced my pleasure. 
Alternatively if, e.g., keeping to the speed limit does not only cost me time 
and efforts, but in addition I loose an unexceptionally large thrill of speeding 
in a populated area, the mere threat of liability might not adequately deter me 
from speeding. 
22 If the utility the injurer derives from the act is regarded as socially illicit, the 
act should be deterred completely. Damages then should be so high that they 
deter even the injurer who yields these unaccepted benefits or bears these un-
accepted costs.38 According to Polinksy and Shavell, this reason for punitive 
damages is limited in scope, because many socially undesirable acts do not 
seem to be associated with social illicit utility, since they are not aimed at 
causing harm.39 
23 In addition to this relativization, the idea of labelling costs or benefits as so-
cially illicit is criticized by, among others, Friedman. Labelling certain activi-
ties as socially unacceptable, even if they would yield more benefits to the in-
jurer than losses to the victim, assumes the conclusion that such acts are unde-
 
35 Wilcox, no. 183. 
36 Borghetti, no. 12. 
37 Borghetti, no. 29. 
38 Ellis, S. Cal. L. Rev. 56 (1982) 32; R.D. Cooter, Economic Analysis of Punitive Dam-
ages, S. Cal. L. Rev. 56 (1982) 87 ff.; Polinksy and Shavell (fn. 14) 194. 
39 Polinksy and Shavell (fn. 14) 194. Also see Sebok, no. 29. 
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sirable, instead of proving it.40 However, given that with such intentional torts, 
the gains (if they exist at all) are often outweighed by the losses,41 they will 
often indeed be socially undesirable because they lower social welfare. It 
therefore makes economic sense that in cases of intentional torts, punitive 
damages occur relatively frequently.42 
D. Induce Voluntary Transfers 
24 In situations where transaction costs are low enough for parties to be able to 
negotiate with each other about the price to pay to transfer an entitlement, 
economic theory has a preference for voluntary transfers over involuntary 
transfers. In economic terms, entitlements in such situations are protected by 
property rules, where the only accepted way of transfer is a voluntary transac-
tion. In situations of high transaction costs, on the other hand, entitlements are 
protected by liability rules, where the entitlement can also be taken without 
consent of the owner. The taker subsequently has to pay an objectively deter-
mined amount to the owner of the entitlement, i.e. damages.43 Property rule 
protection in situations of high transaction costs could effectively hinder a de-
sirable reallocation of resources to take place, because it is too expensive for 
the parties involved to achieve a transaction. 
25 Property rules are preferred in settings of low transaction costs because the 
parties involved are assumed to know their own preferences better than a 
judge does. Hence, the price that results in a voluntary transfer is a better as-
sessment of the valuations of the parties involved than the damages that are 
set after a tort. In the words of Landes and Posner: „When the costs of volun-
tary market transactions are low, the property approach is economically pref-
erable to the liability approach because the market is a more reliable register 
of values than the legal system.‟44 In addition, the assessment of losses, which 
 
40 D.D. Friedman, An Economic Explanation of Punitive Damages, Ala. L. Rev. 40 (1989) 
1128 ff. and D.D. Friedman, Law‟s Order: What Economics Has to Do with Law and 
Why it Matters (2000) 230 ff. Also see D.D. Haddock, F.S. McChesney and M. Spiegel, 
An Ordinary Economic Rationale for Extraordinary Legal Sanctions, California Law 
Review (Cal. L. Rev.) 78 (1990) 12; S. Marks, Utility and Community: Musings on the 
Tort/Crime Distinction, Boston University Law Review (B.U.L.Rev.) 76 (1996) 215 ff; 
K.N. Hylton, Punitive Damages and the Economic Theory of Penalties, The Georgetown 
Law Journal (Geo. L.J.) 87 (1998) 464 ff. 
41 D.D. Ellis, An Economic Theory of Intentional Torts: A Comment, International Review 
of Law and Economics (Int. Rev. Law and Econ.) 3 (1983) 50. 
42 Sebok, no. 6. 
43 See, among others, G. Calabresi and A.D. Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and 
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, Harv. L. Rev 85 (1972) 1089-1128; J.E. Krier 
and S.J. Schwab, Property Rules and Liability Rules: The Cathedral in Another Light, 
New York University Law Review (N.Y.U. L. Rev.) 70 (1995) 440-483; L. Kaplow and 
S. Shavell, Property Rules versus Liability Rules: An Economic Analysis, Harv. L. Rev 
109 (1996) 713-790. 
44 Landes and Posner (fn. 7) 31. 
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is necessary under liability rules, can be very costly.45 Furthermore, even 
though parties could also negotiate in a setting of low transaction costs if enti-
tlements were protected by liability rules, such a form of protection would 
cause several problems: (1) if the owner successfully has bought off a poten-
tial infringer, another possible injurer might try to take away the entitlement 
after all; (2) the owner and potential infringers may invest resources to avoid 
respectively enable the infringement (e.g. a burglar alarm and instruments to 
circumvent the alarm), which is socially undesirable; and (3) the owner may, 
after his entitlement is taken from him, try to take it back from the infringer, 
who then tries again, et cetera.46 Finally, if owners have to accept infringe-
ments of their entitlements, they might have fewer incentives to invest in ac-
quiring property. 
26 Punitive damages may induce a potential injurer to seek a voluntary transfer 
rather than to commit the tort, if liability including punitive damages is more 
costly than seeking the voluntary transfer. Without these punitive damages, 
the injurer could decide to commit the tort after all, if compensatory damages 
fall short of his private gain. Given the difficulties in correctly assessing dam-
ages, the private loss to the victim, however, might exceed the gains to the in-
jurer, so that the involuntary transfer lowers social welfare. If only a voluntary 
transfer would have been possible, this problem would not occur, because the 
transfer then only takes place if the potential buyer values the entitlement 
higher than the potential seller. 
27 Polinsky and Shavell mention an additional problem. If injurers know that 
compensatory damages fall short of true losses, they might spend resources to 
look for property which they can take without having to compensate its full 
value and victims invest in avoiding this. Both expenditures lower social wel-
fare. The authors provide the example of copyright infringements.47 Here 
again, the construction of basing damages on the profits of the infringer may 
be a good solution to avoid this problem. Several country reports show that in-
fringements of intellectual property are indeed situations in which punitive 
damages can be granted, or at least where damages may be based on the gains 
of the infringer rather than the losses of the victim.48 
28 The line of reasoning that a higher sanction induces voluntary transfers is also 
an important argument in the economic theory of criminal law. The idea then 
is that, even if the probability of being held liable is 100%, mere damages 
would not be an adequate remedy against certain acts. After all, if an injurer in 
a setting of low transaction costs would take an entitlement without consent 
 
45 Krier and Schwab, N.Y.U. L. Rev. 70 (1995) 440-483; Kaplow and Shavell, Harv. L. 
Rev 109 (1996) 713-790. 
46 Kaplow and Shavell, Harv. L. Rev 109 (1996) 766 ff. 
47 Polinksy and Shavell (fn. 14) 195. 
48 J. Neethling, report South Africa, no. 26; Wilcox, no. 39 ff.; Borghetti, no. 11 ff.; Jansen 
and Rademacher, no. 12 ff.; Del Olmo, no. 15 ff. 
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and pay damages with a 100% certainty, in essence he converts a property 
rule protection into a liability rule protection. In order to avoid this, the sanc-
tion has to outweigh the losses. The prospective injurer will then choose to 
acquire the entitlement in a voluntary transfer instead of through an involun-
tary taking. 
29 For example, suppose that I value the car of my neighbour higher than its 
market value, but that the subjective valuation of my neighbour for his car is 
only known to him. If I buy the car from my neighbour in a voluntary transac-
tion, it is certain that I value the car higher than he does, because the price I 
was willing to pay was high enough for him to sell the car. Our transaction 
hence has improved our situation. However, were I to steal his car and subse-
quently would only have to pay the market value, our joint situation may 
worsen. After all, even though my personal valuation of the car was higher 
than the market value so that I was willing to pay the objective price, it is pos-
sible that it is lower than the subjective valuation of my neighbour. Hence, the 
amount I have to pay in the case of theft should be higher than the value of the 
car. 
30 This higher sanction than the value of the entitlement is known as a „kicker‟.49 
Punitive damages likewise may serve to avoid the injurer from converting a 
property rule into a liability rule.50 Disgorging all gains the injurer yielded by 
committing the tort fits into this idea. 
III. Economic Reasons for Punitive Damages: Punishment 
A. Tort Law and Criminal Law 
31 In the economic analysis of crimes and criminal law, maximization of social 
welfare is often regarded as the most important goal.51 Hence, both tort law 
and criminal law serve the same goal: deterrence. In the literature on the topic 
of „optimal enforcement‟, several arguments are developed as to why criminal 
law is needed as a deterrence mechanism alongside tort law.52 
 
49 Calabresi and Melamed, Harv. L. Rev 85 (1972) 1126; A.K. Klevorick, On the Eco-
nomic Theory of Crime, in J.R. Pennock and J.W. Chapman (eds.), Criminal Justice, 
NOMOS XXVII (1985) 289-309; J.L. Coleman, Crime, Kickers and Transaction Struc-
tures, in J.R. Pennock and J.W. Chapman (eds.), Criminal Justice, NOMOS XXVII 
(1985) 311-328. 
50 Haddock, McChesney and Spiegel, Cal. L. Rev. 78 (1990) 17 ff. 
51 See e.g. G.S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach‟, Journal of Po-
litical Economy (J.P.E.) 76 (1968) 169-217; R.A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law (6
th
 
ed. 2003) 217 ff; Shavell (fn. 7) 543 ff.; Cooter and Ulen (fn. 7) 510. 
52 See e.g. S. Shavell, The Optimal Structure of Law Enforcement, J. L. & Econ. 36 (1993) 
255-287. 
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32 First, if the probability of being held liable in tort law is below 100%, the 
expected sanction is not high enough to deter potential injurers. Above, this 
same topic is presented as an argument if favour of punitive damages. How-
ever, in countries where punitive damages are not permissible, criminal law 
may be used to increase the expected sanction.53 
33 Second, if the injurer is judgment proof, a financial sanction might not ade-
quately deter him. Criminal law can apply non-monetary sanctions, which 
may be able to provide the necessary incentives. Obviously, the use of puni-
tive damages might suffer from this same problem: if the injurer cannot pay 
the punitive damages, he might not be deterred by them. Applying criminal 
law could then be a necessary step. 
34 Third, and related, criminal law stigmatizes the convict. The fear of this 
stigma may provide behavioural incentives to the potential wrongdoer, where 
financial sanctions might not have been enough.54 
35 Fourth, the use of criminal law solves the rational apathy problem. After all, it 
is no longer the victim who has to initiate the procedure, but the State.55 Also 
in situations where the victim does not have enough information regarding the 
identity of the wrongdoer or about the existence of an infringement in the first 
place, the fact that the State initiates the procedure is an advantage of the 
criminal law system. After all, the State can make use of investigative meth-
ods and information systems such as fingerprint and DNA databases, which 
the victim cannot apply.56 
36 The drawback of criminal law is that the administrative costs generally out-
weigh those of the tort system. After all, the severity of the sanction and the 
fact that criminal law does not shift an existing loss but rather adds another 
loss, calls for procedural safeguards to avoid wrongful convictions.57 In addi-
 
53 See e.g. Shavell, J. L. & Econ. 36 (1993) 266, 276ff. 
54 For economically oriented literature on stigmatization, see e.g. E. Rasmusen, Stigma and 
Self-Fulfilling Expectations of Criminality, J. L. & Econ. 39 (1996) 519-543; D.M. Ka-
han and E.A. Posner, Shaming White-Collar Criminals: A Proposal for Reform of the 
Federal Sentencing Guidelines, J. L. & Econ. 42 (1999) 365-391; P. Funk, On the Effec-
tive Use of Stigma as a Crime-Deterrent, European Economic Review (E.E.R.) 48 
(2004) 715-728. 
55 Due to limited resources, the State will not be able to respond to all contraventions, so 
that some violations will go undeterred. It is, however, important to realise that the idea 
of optimal enforcement does not aim at maximum deterrence, but at optimal deterrence, 
where the costs and benefits of additional enforcement measures are weighed. See e.g. 
A.M. Polinksy and S. Shavell, Enforcement Costs and the Optimal Magnitude and Prob-
ability of Fines, J. L. & Econ. (35) 1992, 133, 138. 
56 Shavell, J. L. & Econ. 36 (1993) 269, 278. 
57 From an economic point of view, this is a crucial difference with punitive damages, 
which are intended to offset the problems which frustrate the preventive potential of tort 
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tion, non-monetary sanctions (i.e. imprisonment) are much more expensive to 
execute than monetary sanctions (i.e. fines and damages). Hence, criminal law 
should be used as an ultimum remedium. The fact that criminal law up to a 
certain degree may be „self-enforcing‟ (in the sense that most people do not 
want to be associated with crimes) strengthens the ultimum remedium charac-
ter. After all, if too many acts are criminalized, the self-enforcing character is 
weakened. 
B. Punitive Damages and Punishment 
37 Given the abovementioned economic approach to criminal law, most punish-
ment arguments for punitive damages are actually deterrence arguments in 
disguise. The punitive character is, at least from an economic point of view, 
intended to strengthen the preventive functioning of tort law, where compen-
satory damages are not sufficient. Increasing total damages is then necessary 
to offset the too low probability of being held liable, to counterbalance so-
cially illicit costs or benefits or to induce voluntary transfers. 
38 The advantage of using punitive damages rather than criminal law is that the 
high administrative costs of criminal law are avoided, and that its ultimum 
remedium character is maintained. However, the judgment proof problem 
poses limits to the possibility of punitive damages to solve the problem of the 
too low probability of being held liable. The non-monetary sanctions of 
criminal law are then needed to provide the correct incentives.58 
39 Analysed like this, punishment is not a goal in itself, but it serves the goal of 
prevention. Polinksy and Shavell however also analyse the separate goal of 
punishment, where the punishment objective is derived from the desire of in-
dividuals to have blameworthy parties appropriately punished. The correct 
level of punishment then depends on the reprehensibility of the party‟s ac-
tions. If the defendant is a firm, it is difficult to punish the blameworthy indi-
viduals within the firm through punitive damages. First, it might be difficult 
for the firm to find the culpable employee. Second, it remains to be seen if the 
internal sanction that the firm applies is influenced by the punitive damages. 
Third, especially in cases of dispersed responsibility, it is doubtful whether a 
culpable employee exists. In the end, it is often the shareholders and the cus-
tomers who get „punished‟, not the blameworthy employee.59 
40 The correct amount of punitive damages for the goal of punishment is deter-
mined by the reprehensibility of the wrongdoer‟s actions. The punishment 
goal implies that the culpable injurer should suffer a utility loss that corre-
 
law. Punitive damages hence do not add another loss, but compensate for the too low 
probability of being held liable, the underestimation of losses, et cetera. 
58 Also see Haddock, McChesney and Spiegel, Cal. L. Rev. 78 (1990) 48 ff. 
59 Polinksy and Shavell, Harv. L. Rev. 111 (1998) 948 ff. 
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sponds to the blameworthiness of his behaviour. This entails that the level of 
wealth of the defendant is assessed, because the utility decrease that is caused 
by the duty to pay damages depends inter alia on his wealth. Hence, the 
wealthier the defendant, the higher punitive damages should be to reach the 
punishment goal.60 Wealth of the defendant is a relevant factor in the United 
States and in England.61 
IV. Tension between the Goals of Deterrence and Punishment 
41 After having discussed both the deterrence goal and the punishment goal of 
punitive damages, it is possible to highlight a few tensions that exist between 
both goals. 
A. When Should Punitive Damages be Awarded? 
42 The deterrence objective of punitive damages dictates that they are awarded if 
the probability that the injurer is held liable is below 100%, if certain costs or 
benefits from the injurer are regarded as socially illicit, if compensatory dam-
ages systematically under-compensate the victim and if the injurer should be 
induced to seek a voluntary transfer. The punishment goal, in as far as it does 
not serve the deterrence goal, states that punitive damages should be awarded 
if the behaviour of the injurer was reprehensible. 
43 Reprehensibility of the behaviour is not directly relevant for the deterrence 
goal. In cases where reprehensible behaviour almost certainly leads to liabil-
ity, punitive damages are not required to adequately deter the tortfeasor. The 
Exxon Valdez case is regarded in the economic literature as an example of 
this, because the probability of a tort suit following the accident was close to 
100%.62 The reprehensibility of the captain regularly being drunk while on 
duty then is irrelevant. On the other hand, irreprehensible behaviour with a 
low probability of being held liable might require punitive damages after all. 
Only if the reprehensibility is connected to the social illicitness of gains or 
costs, it might be a relevant factor for the deterrence goal.63  
44 The Supreme Court itself states that the problem of a low probability of being 
detected and the problem of rational apathy do not play a role in the Exxon 
Valdez case and hence cannot justify high punitive awards: „Heavier punitive 
awards have been thought to be justifiable when wrongdoing is hard to detect 
(increasing chances of getting away with it)… or when the value of injury and 
the corresponding compensatory award are small (providing low incentives to 
 
60 Polinksy and Shavell, Harv. L. Rev. 111 (1998) 953.  
61 Sebok, no. 78 ff., Wilcox, no. 76. 
62 Polinksy and Shavell, Harv. L. Rev. 111 (1998) 904. For a critical view, see Hylton (fn 
40) 452 ff.  
63 Polinksy and Shavell (fn. 14) 196. 
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sue).‟ (Section IV B). „We know, for example, that Congress devised the 
treble damages remedy for private antitrust actions with an eye to supplement-
ing official enforcement by inducing private litigation, which might otherwise 
have been too rare if nothing but compensatory damages were available at the 
end of the day…That concern has no traction here, in this case of staggering 
damage inevitably provoking governmental enforcers to indict and any num-
ber of private parties to sue.‟ (Section IV F2). „In a well-functioning system, 
we would expect that awards at the median or lower would roughly express 
jurors‟ sense of reasonable penalties in…cases (again like this one) without 
the modest economic harm or odds of detection that have opened the door to 
higher awards‟ (Section IV F3). 
B. Wealth of the Defendant 
45 Above it became clear that the wealth level of the defendant is relevant for the 
punishment goal, because it influences the utility loss experienced by the in-
jurer when having to pay a certain amount of damages. For the deterrence 
goal, however, wealth is in principle irrelevant, besides the above-discussed 
topic of judgment proof.64 Liability serves the goal to internalize the external-
ities caused by the injurer. By compensating the losses, multiplied by a factor 
to offset the too low probability of being held liable, this internalization is 
reached. Further increasing damages on the basis of the level of wealth would 
lead to over-deterrence. However, if injurers cannot insure against punitive 
damages and they are risk-averse, expected liability need not be full in order 
to provide adequate behavioural incentives. In such a situation, the poorer the 
injurer is, the lower the punitive damages award can be to still be able to off-
set the too low probability of being held liable.65 
C. Insurance Against Punitive Damages 
46 If punitive damages are intended to offset the too low probability of being 
held liable, injurers should be able to insure against punitive damages. It is 
well established in the economic literature that the availability of liability in-
surance increases social welfare, provided that the problems of adverse selec-
tion and moral hazard can be adequately tackled.66 Injurers should hence be 
able to cover liability for the expected losses. Given that punitive damages 
serve to increase expected liability to the level of expected losses, they should 
be insurable.67 Ellis argues that the problem of moral hazard is a reason not to 
allow insurance against punitive damages.68 The same is mentioned by Ebert 
in her report on Liability Insurance. She states that the moral hazard problem 
 
64 See e.g. Cooter, Ala. L. Rev. 40 (1989) 1176, 1177. 
65 Polinksy and Shavell, Harv. L. Rev. 111 (1998) 913. 
66 Shavell (fn. 7) 257 ff. 
67 Cooter, Ala. L. Rev. 40 (1989) 1182 ff.; Polinksy and Shavell, Harv. L. Rev. 111 (1998) 
932 ff.; Polinksy and Shavell (fn. 14) 197. 
68 Ellis, S. Cal. L. Rev. 56 (1982) 74. 
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cannot be adequately addressed because there are too few verdicts to estimate 
the individual risk.69 However, given that the economic approach favors a 
more regular use of punitive damages, which is far better predictable than the 
current practise and which is strongly connected to the compensatory dam-
ages, this problem in my view is rather limited. 
47 The story obviously is completely different from the punishment perspective. 
In order for punitive damages to be able to punish the injurer, he should ex-
perience the negative utility that is caused by the duty to pay. Insurance 
against punitive damages would frustrate this objective, so that insurance 
against punishments should not be allowed.70 However, it remains to be seen 
if the injurer, especially if it is an individual, would be able to pay the punitive 
damages without insurance.71 If the injurer is judgment proof, punitive dam-
ages would not be able to punish adequately. As is already explained in no. 33 
above, the judgment proof problem forms an argument for criminal law as ad-
dition to tort law, because it can make use of non-monetary sanctions. 
48 Cooter and Ulen argue, based on the judgment proof problem and the need for 
non-monetary sanctions that arise from it, that insurance against criminal fines 
can make economic sense. In order to combat the possible problem of moral 
hazard, the insurance company would want to monitor policy-holders to deter 
them from committing crimes. Private enforcement by insurance companies 
would then supplement public enforcement by the police.72 The same line of 
reasoning could be followed with respect to punitive damages. However, as 
Shavell has pointed out, insurance against the financial consequences of 
wrongful behaviour will not be bought, because it is too expensive. It is 
cheaper for the potential wrongdoer not to commit the wrong, than to commit 
it and collect the insurance benefits. The premium for such insurance out-
weighs the benefits.73 Be this as it may, Cooter and Ulen‟s argument is based 
on the deterrence goal of criminal law, not on the goal of punishment in itself. 
In my view, this latter goal still cannot be reconciled with insurance against 
fines or punitive damages, because insurance would bar the negative conse-
quences of the sanction from fully reaching the wrongdoer. 
 
69 I. Ebert, report on Liability Insurance, no. 5. However, in no. 9 she mentions the use of 
deductibles as a possible way to avoid moral hazard. 
70 Also see A.M. Polinsky and S. Shavell, The Optimal Trade off between the Probability 
and Magnitude of Fines, The American Economic Review (A.E.R.) 69 (1979) 885 ff. 
71 It does not become clear from the reports on the United States and England whether this 
problem is a reason for considering the wealth of the defendant. Seboks remark in no. 78 
that in Maine, “the punitive damage award must take into account defendant‟s wealth in 
order to adequately affect the defendant and fulfil the award‟s punishment and deterrent 
purposes” rather pertains to the opposite situation, where the defendant is so wealthy that 
damages may be too low to have a real effect. Wilcox‟ remark in no. 76 that “the idea is 
to take the profit out of wrongdoing” suggests the same. 
72 Cooter and Ulen (fn. 7) 514. 
73 Shavell (fn. 7) 264 ff. 
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49 Faure and Heine also argue that insurance of fines as such is not to be consi-
dered undesirable. It can increase social utility, provided that the insurance 
company can monitor the insured so that the preventive function of the crimi-
nal sanction is shifted to the insurer.74 Here again, the authors regard the sanc-
tion as an instrument of deterrence. The argument that insurance cannot be re-
conciled with the goal of punishment as such, therefore in my view still holds 
true. 
D. Should Punitive Damages be Based on Gains or Losses? 
50 Besides the points already discussed above in no. 19, the differences between 
the goals of prevention and punishment are also relevant for answering the 
question whether punitive damages should be based on the gains to the 
wrongdoer or the losses of the victim(s). Hylton discusses the possible goals 
of loss internalization (i.e. confronting the injurer with the losses he has 
caused) and gain elimination (removing the benefits the injurer obtains from 
his behaviour) and he distinguishes the situation where the gains are smaller 
than the losses from the opposite situation.75 
51 It has been argued that the internalization approach is the better option, be-
cause: (1) if gains exceed losses, basing damages on the losses compensates 
the victim while still enabling the injurer with high enough gains to perform 
the behaviour;76 and (2) if gains are smaller than the losses, the behaviour is 
undesirable and any sanction that exceeds the gains would be able to deter the 
injurer. However, Hylton challenges this pro-internalization view. 
52 According to Hylton, if the gains are smaller than the losses, the optimal sanc-
tion might differ from the loss-internalization level. If due to excessive dis-
counting some people would not be deterred by the mere elimination of gains, 
higher sanctions might be required, even higher than the loss-internalization 
level. If, on the other hand, higher sanctions would lead to more violent beha-
viour (e.g. to avoid detection), a lower sanction might be optimal. Another 
reason why the sanction should not always be based on loss-internalization, is 
that the losses are sometimes more difficult to assess than the gains, e.g. in an-
titrust cases. 
53 In situations where the gains exceed the losses, this does not necessarily mean 
that the loss-internalization level is the correct basis for the sanction. After all, 
there are more social losses than the mere losses of the victim (e.g. costs of 
 
74 M. Faure and G. Heine, The Insurance of Fines: the Case of Oil Pollution, The Geneva 
Papers on Risk and Insurance – Issues and Practice (G.P.R.I.I.P.) 16 (1991), 47. 
75 Hylton (fn 40) 423 ff. 
76 It is interesting to note that exactly this possibility of the tortfeasor still performing the 
behaviour because his gains exceed the losses of the victim, is sometimes regarded as an 
argument for punitive damages. See Wilcox, no. 180 ff.; Borghetti, no. 36; Jansen and 
Rademacher, no. 11. 
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law enforcement and litigation and the losses of others than the direct victim). 
Basing the sanction on the gains instead of on the losses might then be a good 
solution, because it deters the behaviour altogether. Especially in cases where 
the possible losses due to over-deterrence are small (e.g. in cases of theft, 
where the potential thief who values the good higher than the owner still has 
the option of buying it from the owner), this is a good solution.77 
54 In order to determine the correct amount of punitive damages, it is therefore 
important to assess the gains to the injurer and the social losses of his beha-
viour.78 Reprehensibility of the conduct might serve as an indication that the 
gains do not exceed the social losses, because the gain only materializes at the 
expense of a loss of the victim.79 The choice between loss-internalization 
damages and gain-removing damages ultimately boils down to the question 
whether the goal is to induce the potential injurer to choose an optimal level 
of care and activity, or to completely deter his behaviour. In the first scenario, 
losses should be internalized, in the second, gains should be eliminated. Ac-
cording to Hylton, in many cases of punitive damages, gain-elimination is 
preferable and the risk of over deterrence is not relevant, because the behav-
iour should be deterred completely.80 
V. Conclusion 
55 In the economic analysis of law, prevention and spreading of losses are re-
garded as the most important goals of tort law. Damages are the instrument 
with which these goals are aimed for. The economic analysis of criminal law 
focuses at deterrence as well. Punitive damages are therefore primarily re-
garded as an instrument which can, when necessary, improve the deterrent 
function of tort law. They may be required in this respect to offset the fact that 
the probability of being held liable falls short of 100%, to respond to the prob-
lem that the harm is sometimes underestimated, to correct for socially unac-
cepted costs or benefits of the tortfeasor or to induce the latter to seek a volun-
tary transfer with the victim rather than to commit the tort. 
56 Given the focus on deterrence, the goal of punishment in itself does not play a 
major role in the economic analysis of law in general, or in the economic 
analysis of punitive damages specifically. If both goals are treated separately, 
nonetheless, some tensions prove to exist. They regard the role of reprehensi-
bility, the wealth level of the defendant, the question whether insurance 
 
77 Hylton (fn 40) 438. 
78 Hylton (fn 40) 441. 
79 Hylton (fn 40) 456. Also see M.F. Grady, Punitive Damages and Subjective States of 
Mind: A Positive Economic Theory, Ala. L. Rev. 40 (1989) 1214 ff, who argues that 
courts rightfully distinguish between inadvertent negligence (which often is efficient) 
and deliberate negligence (which is not). 
80 Hylton (fn 40) 467. 
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against punitive damages is allowed and the questions whether damages 
should be based on harm to the victim or gains of the tortfeasor. 
57 When connecting the economic insights to the country reports, it became clear 
that some reports contrast with the economic analysis, e.g. the Spanish report 
which states that compensation is regarded as the only normative goal of non-
contractual liability and the emphasis that some reports put on the punishment 
goal in itself. In many instances, however, the economic analysis nicely fits 
the legal treatment of punitive damages, e.g. the connection between the size 
of compensatory damages and punitive damages, the role of punitive damages 
in overcoming the problem of rational apathy and the fact that punitive dam-
ages are often granted in situation of immaterial losses or with intentional 
torts. 
